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Abstract 
 
 
When defining how to implement tendering procedures for the regional bus 
transportation industry, one of the main problems local authorities have to face is 
setting the area size to be assigned as franchised monopoly. 
This paper’s aim is to analyze the topic by combining some empirical results 
and evidence from recent experience [developments] in the Italian regional bus 
industry. The empirical results show that the bus transportation sector is 
characterized by the presence of economies of density and scale These results 
imply that the best strategy for introducing competition in the bus industry is a 
competitive tendering approach for an area of given dimension and not 
necessarily a route-by-route tendering.  However, it seems that the criterion 
applied by local authorities in Italy is much more related to political issues – such 
as jurisdictional boundaries of a municipal or provincial area – than a desire to 
promote the exploitation of economies of scale and density. 
 
                                                 
§ We are grateful to the members of the scientific commission of CIRIEC for their comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. We would also like to thank Gina Poncini for proofreading the final version of this 
paper. The views expressed in this paper are strictly personal. Responsibility for any remaining errors lies 
solely with the authors.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years many EU-member countries have decided to introduce a 
competitive tendering procedure in the assignment of franchised monopolies in 
the regional and local transportation industry, including bus, underground and 
local trains. This process has been generated by the obligation of the member 
countries to implement the European Directive 1191/69/EU (modified by 
1893/91/EU). Over the past 15 years, a number of nations have already introduced 
competition "for the market" in the provision of local public transport services, 
especially bus services. These experiences have produced some positive effects 
both on productivity and cost savings. 1 
Competitive tendering is the main mechanism to create competitive pressure 
in a market in which open competition between different transport operators is 
not possible or uneconomic. Thus, if competition in the market is limited for 
technical reasons, the only way to enhance the efficiency is to introduce 
competition for the market (Demsetz, 1968; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Klemperer, 
1999). However, the implementation of tendering procedures is not so simple; 
local authorities have to correctly define the structure of a competitive tendering 
procedure in order to avoid negative effects for the whole local transport market 
and consequently for customers. 2 
In particular, local authorities have the faculty to define different sizes of the 
service areas to be assigned as franchised monopoly in the regional bus 
transportation industry. They can open a competitive tendering process for a 
single bus line, or they can decide to open a tendering process for a system of bus 
lines, for instance for a whole regional bus network. The different choice of the 
size of the service area has extremely important impacts on the organization of 
the local transport market (i.e. the presence of only one firm for an entire network 
or several firms operating in different parts of a network) and on the way the 
                                                 
1 For a presentation of these experiences and their effects see Cox and De Velde (1998) and Cox 
and Duthion (2001). For a detailed analysis of the competitive tendering procedure held in London, 
see White and Though (1995), Matthews et al.  (2001) and London Transport Buses (2002). For the 
Swedish case, see SPTA (2002).  
2 For a presentation of the potential problems in the implementation of competitive tendering 
process, see  Toner (2001) and Boitani and Cambini (2002a). 
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transport actors, firms and local governments, could plan and re-design the 
provision of final services (i.e. frequencies of buses, choice of the number of bus 
lines, and so on).  
A correct definition of the optimal size of a service area in the bus 
transportation industry is, therefore, extremely important and, like any other 
network industry such as telecommunications, gas, energy, and water, it is hardly 
linked to the dimension of economies of scale. Therefore, in order to implement 
the tendering processes, it is necessary for the regulator or local governments to 
have information on the optimal size of the service territory.  
The purpose of this study is to make a contribution to the debate on the 
introduction of competitive tendering procedures in the local bus transportation 
sector. In the first part of the paper, we analyse the main elements that a local 
authority must define in implementing a competitive tendering procedure in local 
public transport industry. In the second part, we present a review of some recent 
empirical studies on the issue of economies of scale in the regional bus 
transportation industry. In particular, a recent study on the cost structure of a 
sample of Italian bus companies is discussed.  
Finally, in the third part of the paper we focus on the tendering process held in 
Italy in the last two years. The Italian case is particularly interesting since, in order 
to enhance efficiency and competitive pressure, non-tendered concessions will be 
banned as of January 2004; by that date all subsidised local transport services 
must be tendered off, either route by route or by a bunching of routes. Up to now 
many Italian regions have already defined a tendering procedure and some of 
them have completed the process and declared the franchised firms. However, in 
many cases the choice of the size of the network seems to be far from being 
optimal, at least from an economic point of view. 
The policy implications and the conclusions are examined in the last part of the 
paper. 
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2. Properties of a competitive tendering procedure in local public transport 
The organization and implementation of a competitive tendering process in 
the bus industry is complex because many aspects must be taken into account 
and clarified.3 For the purpose of this paper we identified six main aspects.4  
First, the local authority has to define the contractual form to offer to the 
winning bidders. In this regard, it is important to define the two types of on-going 
risks that a supplier of transport services has to face: the production risk, 
associated with the production cost of the services’ provision; and the revenue (or 
commercial) risk, associated with the sale of transport services. The different 
allocation of these risks defines a set of different types of contracts that could be 
tendered (Isotope, 1997): 
- Gross Cost Contract: the transport firm bears only the production risk while 
the revenue risk is born by the tendering authority. The firm receives a price 
related to an anticipated level of production cost. Revenues accrue only to the 
tendering authority. 
- Net Cost Contract: both risks are born by the transport firm. It receives a price 
determined in the tendering process, consisting of the difference between 
anticipated total costs and traffic revenues.5 
In addition, there are other kind of incentive contracts between local 
authorities and the transport firm6, in which the revenue risk is split between 
actors. The different types of contract raise different incentives to minimize costs 
and/or to control revenues, and these contracts must be specified ex ante in the 
design of the tendering procedure. 
                                                 
3 Notice that, since transport services are basically unprofitable, the price that comes out of a 
competitive tendering normally consists of the remuneration that the winning bidder requires to 
run the services and not a price to pay to get the rights to run the services. 
4 For a discussion on this issue see also Isotope (1997), Toner (2001) and Boitani and Cambini 
(2002a). Note that, in general, an efficient outcome of an award procedure depends on several 
factors, in particular the number of participants, the inexistence of barriers to entry and the 
presence of perfect knowledge on technologies  to be used among operators (Klemperer, 1999). 
5 Another type of contract which was employed in France is the Management Contract. In this case both 
production and revenue risks are born by the tendering authority instead of the transport firm. The 
manager of the company receives remuneration regardless of the level of costs or revenues achieved. 
6 These are gross cost contracts with revenue incentive, or net cost contracts with shared revenue risk. 
 5 
The second relevant aspect to consider in the implementation of a competitive 
tendering process is the dimension of the service area to be tendered.  The local 
authority could organise a: 
Route-by-route tendering: this assures an efficient production of services, 
since the level of potential bidders is high and thus competition is more intense; 
however, it could increase the total cost of service planning, since the local 
authority has to integrate the entire range of services provided by the different 
operators. This tendering procedure could successfully be used to assign inter-city 
routes that in general are more profitable than urban services and are usually 
supplied by transport operators in order to cross-subsidize urban services.7  
Network tendering: consists of a competitive tendering regarding the 
assignment to the best bidder of transport services in a whole urban or regional 
area. Even if this method maintains the integrity of the network, it presents some 
disadvantages. Firstly, the complexity of the services to provide increases the 
organizational costs of the tendering procedure. Moreover, if we apply this 
procedure to allocate transport services in a big town or a metropolitan area, the 
potential number of bidders would be relatively low, since it is difficult for a small 
operator to provide services in a big city. Therefore, the potential benefits from 
competition for the market would be lower. 
Sub-basin tendering: the tendered area is divided in sub-basins in which the 
winning bidders have to provide a bunching of routes. Reducing the area to serve 
increases the number of potential bidders and thus enhances the competitive 
pressure in the tendering process. In addition, the possibility of tendering small 
units, without loss of integration, permits the local authority to compare 
operators’ performance simultaneously (yardstick competition). The main 
problem is defining the single units to award and their size in order to exploit the 
economies of scale or density and to coordinate and correctly plan the services in 
the whole area.  
In conclusion, we can say that there is a trade-off in the definition of the size 
of the bus service area to be assigned through a competitive tendering process. 
                                                 
7 A competitive tendering for these services should define a price the company should pay to the local 
authority to manage the service and not a price the company should receive to provide the service, which 
is usually the case for urban services. 
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On one hand, the definition of a small service area to be assigned, for instance a 
bus line, can guarantee a high level of competition because many operators will 
be able to participate in the tendering process. On the other hand, a small service 
area cannot guarantee an optimal exploitation of the economies of scale.  
Finally there are four other aspects extremely relevant in designing a 
tendering procedure, such as:  
· Service design in the assigned area: the franchised firm could either provide a 
contractually pre-defined services or re-design the services in terms of fares, 
frequencies of buses, bus routes, etc. 
· Service quality: local authorities must define ex ante the minimum service 
quality they want the transport operator to provide to citizens in terms of 
frequencies of buses, security and so on. With regard to this, local authorities 
usually set penalties in case of unjustified reduction in quality provision. 
· Award criteria: the selection criteria must take into account both the 
economic and technical issues of service provision. While the economic 
elements are easily quantified, problems of evaluation emerge from 
operative issues that are difficult to verify and quantify. The possibility of 
assigning arbitrary weights to different elements of the bid could alter the 
final result of the award process. 
· Infrastructure ownership: the ownership of buses, depots and other 
equipment represent a consistent barrier to entry that could prevent new 
operators from entering the market. If the tendering authority owns the 
infrastructure, then these barriers can be eliminated. Otherwise, the 
tendering authority must oblige the incumbent to transfer the entire 
infrastructure to the potential new operator, but it has to define how to 
evaluate the financial value of these capital goods. This last task is extremely 
complex due to the information asymmetry existing between the 
incumbent and the local authority.  
 
Competitive tendering does not end the regulatory process. All the above aspects 
must be clearly signed in a contract between the winning bidder and the local 
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authority; the latter must ex post verify and control that the franchised operator 
follows the rules contractually defined.8 
 
3. Empirical results on the economies of scale and density in the bus industry 
From the economic point of view, as we have seen in the previous section, the 
implementation of tendering processes requires information on the optimal size 
of a service area in the bus industry. Of course, the correct definition of the 
optimal size in the bus transportation industry, a typical network industry, is 
linked to the dimension of economies of scale and density. 
Traditionally, the level of output has been utilized as an indicator of the 
company size in cost model specifications. Recently, however, some authors have 
begun to distinguish between firm size and level of output. This distinction seems 
particularly important for industries in which services are produced over a 
network of spatially distributed points such as the railways and the bus 
industries.9 In these cases it is possible to view the output of a bus or railway 
system as having several dimensions.  Differences between the cost per unit of 
output among companies may be also due to the nature and shape of the 
network they serve. For instance, one might expect a higher level of unit costs if a 
given level of output is provided over a network of 50 km with bifurcations or in a 
simple linear network of 20 km.  
The majority of the most recent cost models used to analyze the cost structure 
of bus companies include as explanatory variables an output indicator as well as a 
network indicator. The output of a bus system can be measured in different ways. 
Many studies on cost structure in the bus industry use the number of passengers 
or the passenger-kilometers as indicators of output.10  Other studies employ bus-
kilometers or seat-kilometers as indicators of output.11  We believe that the use of 
the number of passenger or passenger-kilometers as output indicators is not 
completely correct, because demand-side effects affect these indicators. It is not 
                                                 
8 See McAfee e McMillan (1988). 
9 See Caves et al. (1984), Filippini et al  (1993) and Filippini and Prioni (1994) for applications of this 
approach in measuring the size of a network industry.  
10 See for example Windle (1988) and Levaggi (1994).  
11  See for example  Berechman (1987), Filippini et al. (1992), Fazioli et al. (1993), Filippini and Prioni 
(1994). 
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evident why cost should depend on the number of passengers on a bus. Generally, 
running an empty bus is not cheaper than running a full-one. For this reason, the 
utilization of seat-kilometers or bus-kilometers, which are pure supply indicators, 
seems to be more appropriate. Moreover, in the majority of EU-member states, 
the regulation of the bus sector obliges bus companies to provide services on a 
regular base regardless of the quantity demanded.  
Several researchers have used the number of route-kilometers or the number 
of stops as a measure of network size in studies of the bus industry. 12 For the 
regional bus industry, these two indicators are generally highly correlated and 
seem to be the single most important indicators of the size of a bus system. Of 
course, bus system networks can be described according to many attributes. 
However, from the econometric point of view, due to multicollinearity and degree 
of freedom problems, it is important to select one representative indicator.  
The inclusion of an indicator of the size of the network of a bus company  
along with output allows us to distinguish between economies of scale and 
economies of density.  
Economies of density, whose definition is close to the traditional definition of 
economies of scale, are defined as the proportional increase in total cost resulting 
from a proportional increase in output (Y), holding the network size (N) of the 
company fixed, for instance the length of the bus lines. 13 This is equivalent to the 
inverse of the elasticities of total cost with respect to output, 
Y
TCTC
ED
ln
ln
1
¶
¶
=
                                                                                      (1) 
We will talk of economies of output density if ED is greater than 1, and 
accordingly, diseconomies of output density if ED is below 1. In the case of ED = 1, 
no economies or diseconomies of output density exist. Economies of density exist 
if the average costs of a bus company decrease as output increases through 
higher frequency of bus services on the existing route. This measure is relevant 
                                                 
12 See for instance Windle (1988) or Filippini and Prioni (1994). 
13 See Caves et al. (1984). 
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for deciding whether side-by-side competition or local monopoly is the most 
efficient form in the local bus industry.  
Economies of scale are defined as the proportional increase in total cost 
brought about by a proportional increase in output (Y) and the size of the network 
(N).14 Economies of scale (ES) can thus be defined as:  
N
TC
Y
TC
ESTC
ln
ln
ln
ln
1
¶
¶
¶
¶
+
=                                                                      (2) 
We will talk of economies of scale  if ES is greater than 1, and accordingly, we 
identify diseconomies of scale if ES is below 1. In the case of ES = 1, no economies 
or diseconomies of scale exist.  
Economies of scale are absent if average costs remain constant when a bus 
company increases the length of the network without changing the traffic 
intensity on its network. This measure is very important for defining the optimal 
size of a service area in the regional bus industry to be assigned as a franchised 
monopoly through a competitive tendering process. Further, this measure is 
relevant for analysing the impact on cost of merging two adjacent regional bus 
companies.  
From the empirical point of view, the most relevant studies introducing the 
difference between economies of scale and density are those by Windle (1988), 
Fazioli et. al. (1993), Filippini and Prioni (1994), Fazioli et al. (2002) and Karlaftis and 
McCarthy (2002).15 In table 1 we briefly present some information on these 
studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Caves et al. (1984). 
15 Another interesting and relevant empirical study is Fraquelli et al. (2001). We do not report it in table 
1, since it makes no distinction between economies of scale and density that are the topics of our analysis. 
However, the results in Fraquelli et al. (2001) confirm the main results of  Fazioli et al. (2002) here 
described. 
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Tab. 1: Previous studies on economies of scale and density 
Author(s) Database  Type of 
function 
Measure of 
output and 
network size 
Economies 
of scale 
Economies 
of density 
Windle (1988) 91 US Urban 
Mass Transit 
companies 
operating in 
1978-79 
Total cost 
and 
variable 
cost 
passenger 
miles; 
number of 
route miles 
Nearly 
constant 
Increasing  
Fazioli, 
Filippini, Prioni 
(1993) 
40 Italian 
regional and 
urban bus 
companies 
(Emilia 
Romagna) 
1986-1990 
Total cost vehicle 
kilometers; 
number of 
route 
kilometers 
Increasing Increasing  
Filippini, Prioni 
(1994) 
93 Swiss 
regional and 
urban bus 
companies  
1993 
Total cost vehicle 
kilometers; 
number of 
stops 
Increasing Increasing  
Fazioli, 
Filippini, 
Künzle (2002) 
58 Italian 
regional and 
urban bus 
companies  
1991-1997 
Total cost vehicle 
kilometers; 
number of 
route 
kilometers 
Increasing Increasing  
Karlaftis and 
McCartthy 
(2002) 
256 US regional 
and urban bus 
companies  
1986-1994 
Variable 
cost 
vehicle miles; 
number of 
route miles 
Increasing Increasing  
  
Generally, the empirical results show that the regional bus transportation 
sector is characterized by the presence of economies of density and scale. 16 
In the following sections we present in more detail the study performed by 
Fazioli et al. (2002). In particular, we are interested in knowing if the Italian 
regional bus industry is characterized by the presence of economies of scale and 
density. This result will be utilized in the next section for the discussion on the 
tendering processes performed in Italy during recent years.  
The cost model specification used by Fazioli et al. (2002) is  
 
 TC = AC (Y, N, PL, PC, T) 
 
                                                 
16 It has to be noted that the empirical results by Windle (1988) confirm the presence of short run 
economies of scale and density in the bus industry. Therefore, an increase in the output and the network 
length reduces average variable costs. 
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where TC represents total annually cost, Y is the output represented by the total 
number of bus kilometers, and N is the network indicator described by the length 
of the bus lines in kilometers. PL and PC are the prices of labour and capital, 
respectively. T is a time variable that captures the shift in technology representing 
a change in technical efficiency. 
Fazioli et al. (2002) used a panel of 58 Italian bus companies to estimate this 
model. Of these 58 companies, 17 companies were operating in urban areas, 11 
were operating in rural area and 30 companies were operating in urban as well in 
rural areas. For the econometric estimation of the cost function a translog 
functional form and a fixed effects approach were utilized. The authors found, as 
expected using a fixed effects approach, (1) a high explanatory power of the 
model and (2) a majority of the explanatory variables that were statistically 
significant and with the expected sign.  
The empirical evidence reported in Fazioli et al. (2002) supports the hypothesis 
of density and scale economies in the bus industry. Table 2 presents the estimates 
of economies of density and economies of scale calculated for four types of 
companies: a medium-sized bus companies and three large companies included 
in the sample operating in different service areas. We note that the indicators for 
economies of scale and economies of density are all greater than 1, which means 
that the majority of the Italian bus companies of our sample operate at an 
inappropriately low scale and density level. Of course, it has to be pointed out that 
the values of economies of scale and density reported in the study by Fazioli et al. 
(2002) are estimated using a sample of small and medium-sized companies. The 
largest bus companies operating in Italy, for instance the big urban companies 
operating in cities like Milan or Rome, are not included in the sample. Therefore, 
the conclusion of the study by Fazioli et al. (2002) cannot be generalized to the 
very large urban bus companies.  
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Table 2: Economies of scale and density for different types of bus companies 
 Medium-sized 
companies  
 
Y =  6650360  bus km 
 
N= 899 km 
Companies operating 
in urban as well as in 
regional areas  
Y = 32407000   bus km 
N= 1670 km 
Companies 
operating in a 
regional area 
Y = 25934000   bus km 
N= 9131 km 
Companies 
operating in an 
urban area 
Y = 24563000 bus km 
N= 930 km 
Economies of 
density 
 
2.56 1.42 1.38 1.568 
Economies of 
scale  
 
1.54 1.17 1.21 1.294 
 
The estimated indicators of economies of density can clarify the efficiency of 
side-by-side competition on a given bus line. The finding shows that the cost of 
serving a market of size Y over a bus line with one company is lower than the cost 
of serving the same market with N competitive companies which operate parallel 
on the same line. Therefore, side-by-side competition is less cost-efficient than 
the monopolistic provision of bus services on a given line. This result reinforces 
the idea that the only strategy to introduce competition in the bus industry is 
through a competitive tendering approach and not through a deregulation 
process, i.e. through a side-by-side competition as in the UK. 
The results on economies of scale can help to clarify the issue of optimal 
service territory size for the monopolistic provision of bus services. The results 
show that the small and medium-sized bus companies operate at an 
inappropriately low scale. The service territory area of most of these companies 
appears too small. Therefore, mergers between two small bus companies whose 
service territories are adjacent would improve the scale efficiency of these 
companies. Opening a competition just for a very small bus transportation 
network or just for a bus line does not seem to be efficient. Local authorities 
should take this result into account in the definition of the size of the bus service 
network to be assigned as a franchised monopoly through a competitive 
tendering process. Moreover, opening a competition for single bus lines could 
favor the appearance of cream skimming behaviors, i.e. bus companies could be 
interested in participating only in competitive tendering procedures for bus lines 
interesting from an economic and financial point of view.    
 13 
 
4. Optimal size of the service area and competitive tendering processes in Italy 
Regional and local transport services in Italy has been long provided by public 
firms - owned by national and especially local governments - enjoying monopoly 
protection by means of non-tendered concessions.  
The economic and financial performance of local public transport firms has 
dramatically deteriorated in the last thirty years. The Italian local public transport 
sector has been characterized in the last two decades by increasing costs, sky-
rocketing deficits and a declining market share. Especially labor costs, which 
represent 2/3 of the total operating costs, have increased over years, while traffic 
revenues have remained stationary due to a combination of low fares for 
distributive concerns and a consistent shift from public to private transport. From 
1992 traffic revenues have started to increase, growing from about 940 million 
Euros in 1992 to about 1330 million Euros in 1998 (+40%). Despite this jump, at the 
end of the nineties traffic revenues covered on average only 30% of total 
operating costs while the remaining costs was covered by public (national and 
local) subsidies.  
In order to improve the allocative and productive efficiency of the market, the 
Italian government introduced a new reform (D.lgs. 422/97 and 400/99) whose 
main purpose was to create a more market-oriented industry, enhance 
competition and reduce the huge subsidies to the unprofitable (local and 
national) transport firms. In particular, it stated that non-tendered concessions to 
be banned as of January 2004. By that date all subsidised local transport services 
(rail services included) must be tendered off, either route by route or by a 
bunching of routes. Thus, the actual regime in place in Italy is a so-called limited 
competition regime based on tendering procedures.  
The competitive tendering processes have been in planning in many Italian 
regions, and in some of them they are already concluded. Table 3 shows the 
Italian regions that, as of July 2002, had designed a competitive tendering to 
allocate transport services, pointing out the main elements of the tendering 
procedures. In particular, Table 3 contains information on the contractual form, 
duration of the contracts, the size of the service area (provincial basins, municipal 
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basins or local basins) and the yearly level of the output. This table does not 
contain information on competitive tendering processes organized in large Italian 
cities such as Rome and Genoa17, since they are out of our sample. 
Generally, we can observe that a homogeneous criterion to define the size of 
the bus service area does not exist. In particular, it seems that the regional 
authorities normally choose the size of the service area using the province or 
municipal jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the service area and the level of 
the outputs contained in Table 3 indicate that local authorities do not seem to be 
interested in promoting the exploitation of economies of scale and density. In 
fact, the empirical results by Fazioli et al. (2002) indicate that bus companies with 
an annual production of 25,000,000 million Bus*Km are still characterized by the 
presence of economies of scale and density. Moreover, the small size of the service 
areas did not encourage a high number of competitors to participate to the 
tendering process. Therefore, it seems that political criteria are more relevant 
than economic criteria in the definition of the size of the service area. The design 
of the Italian competitive tendering processes seems not to give incentives to lead 
the transport operators to merge. 
In general the tendering procedure in Italy regards a whole network. In many 
cases, especially for the small and medium-sized Italian provinces, urban and 
inter-city routes are tendered in bundle. Perhaps, a local authority prefers to 
tender jointly these two kinds of transport services in order to let the firm cross-
subsidise the unprofitable urban services with the more profitable intercity 
services and thus reduce the price (or subsidy) to pay to the winning bidder to run 
services.18 
In all the above-mentioned experiences, local governments maintain the 
ownership of the infrastructures and buses. At the moment, these capital goods 
are given for free to the winning bidder. However, in the near future, when the 
                                                 
17  The competitive tendering procedure organized in Rome was limited only to some additional 
transport services consisting in new lines for the Jubilee 2000 and in other 15 million bus*km 
divided in two set (8 and 7,5 million bus*km, respectively). These new routes integrate the 120 
million bus*km provided, with a non-tendered concession, by the incumbent operator, Metrobus 
s.p.a. In the tendering process in Rome a new operator entered the market, a joint venture between Sita 
(belonging to the National railways firm, Ferrovie dello Stato), some local operators (Arpa - Chieti, Apm 
– Perugia) and the French Transdev. It obtains both the routes “J” and the two sets of additional services.  
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Italian reform for all local public utility services (art. 35, L. 448/01) will be in effect, 
infrastructure and buses should be rented at a predefined price to the winning 
bidder.19 Finally, almost everywhere the incumbent operators, in joint venture 
with other local transport operators, won the competitive tendering with a 
reduction on average of 5% and 7% of the reserve price, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                               
18 The winner of the competitive tendering procedure is the company ready to offer predefined transport 
services for the least amount of public subsidies. 
19 It has to be noted that generally the exploitation of the economies of scale and density should allow 
lowering the rental prices for the infrastructure and the buses. 
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 Table 3: The competitive tendering procedures started in the Italian bus industry as of July 2002 
 
 
 
 
Region  Contractual form Dimension Area details Contract’s duration 
Whole region divided in 4 sub-basins corresponding to single 
Provinces: 
 
Trieste (12.772.000 bus *Km) 10 years 
Pordenone (7.467.000 bus *Km) 10 years 
Udine (15.903.000 bus *Km) 10 years 
Friuli Venezia Giulia Net-cost contract Provincial basins 
Gorizia (5.454.000 bus *Km) 10 years 
Whole region (6 mln bus*Km) dividend in 6 sub basins  
· Fondo Valle ("valley floor") and route “Aosta-Turin 
Airport”: 995.000 bus *Km 
6 years (+ 3) 
· Alta Valle ("upper valley"): 1 mln bus *Km 6 years (+ 3) 
· Centro Valle ("central valley"): 1 mln bus *Km 6 years (+ 3) 
· Aosta e cintura (Aosta and surroundings): 1,5 mln 
bus *Km 
6 years (+ 3) 
· Bassa Valle ("lower valley"): 1.1 mln bus *Km 6 years (+ 3) 
Valle d’Aosta Net-cost contract Sub-basins 
· Media Valle ("mid valley"): 0.5 mln bus *Km 6 years (+ 3) 
La Spezia (provincial area) 
9 mln bus *Km 6 years (+ 3) 
Savona (provincial area) 
5.8 mln bus *Km 6 years (+ 3) 
Imperia (provincial area) 
6.8 mln bus *Km 5 years (+ 3) 
Liguria  Net-cost contract 
Provincial or 
municipal basins 
Genova (municipal area) 
33 mln bus *Km 
6 years 
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 Table 3: The competitive tendering procedures started in the Italian bus industry as of July 2002 
Region Contractual form Dimension of the service area Area details Contract’s duration 
2 provincial basins (25 mln bus*Km) + regional routes:  
Matera (8 mln bus *Km) 1 years 
Potenza (15.5 mln bus *Km) 1 years 
Basilicata Net-cost contract  Provincial basins 
Regional routes (2 mln bus *Km) 1 years 
 
Cremona (municipal area) 
1.6 mln bus*Km divided in: 
- urban services: 1.584.000 bus *Km 
- suburban services: 55.675  bus *Km 
 
7 years 
Como (provincial area) 
10.56 mln bus *Km 7 years 
Lecco (provincial area) 
5 mln bus *Km 7 years 
Sondrio (provincial area)  
divided in 3 sub-basins: 
- Alta Valle ("upper valley") (1 mln bus *Km) 
- Media Valle ("mid valley") (1 mln bus *Km) 
Lombardia Net-cost contract (with or without incentives) 
Provincial or 
municipal basins 
- Bassa Valle ("lower valley") (1 mln bus *Km) 
7 years 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze one of the main aspects which 
characterized the definition of a competitive tendering processes in the bus 
industry, the optimal choice of the area size. 
Generally, the empirical results show that the bus transportation sector is 
characterized by the presence of economies of density and scale.  These results 
imply that the only strategy for introducing competition in the bus industry is 
through a competitive tendering approach and not through a deregulation 
process, i.e. through a side-by-side competition as in the UK. Moreover, it seems 
not to be efficient to open a competitive tendering procedure just for a very small 
bus transportation network. Local authorities should take this into account in the 
definition of the size of the bus service network to be assigned.  
It is important to point out that, as far as the Italian analysis is concerned, the 
data regard only transport firms operating in small- to medium-sized towns and 
not in big cities or metropolitan areas like Rome, Milan, Genoa, Turin, Naples, 
Catania, Bari, and Florence. Thus, our empirical results cannot be extended to the 
analysis of the transport system of these cities.  
The Italian government opened the bus industry to competition mandating 
that non-tendered concessions would be banned by January 2004. Up to now 
many, but not all, Italian regions have defined competitive tendering procedures. 
However, it seems that the criterion applied by local authorities to define the area 
dimension to be assigned is much more related to political issues, such as 
jurisdictional boundaries of a municipal or provincial area, rather than a real 
desire to promote the exploitation of economies of scale and density. Therefore, 
the responsibility of the opening of competitive tendering procedures should be 
generally assigned to the regional governments and not to municipalities. Finally, 
the design of the Italian competitive tendering processes does not seem to give 
incentives to lead the transport operators to merge, contrary to what happens in 
many European countries like the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Finland. 
Up to now, the Italian experience has not been so thrilling: incumbent 
operators always win and no new operators (with the exception of the case of 
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Rome) have entered the market. The main effect of competitive tendering has 
been a reduction in subsidies that local governments has to pay, even if these 
reductions have not been so large. 
Is competitive tendering the best way to increase efficiency in local transport 
services? The answer is not so simple; local authorities must be aware that the 
implementation of competitive tendering is very complex. In general, in order to 
be effective, the award process must have some relevant properties, i.e. presence 
of a reasonable number of participants, no barriers to entry, symmetric 
information among participants (Klemperer, 1999). However, when these 
conditions are not satisfied, due to the peculiar characteristics of the market (i.e. 
existence of sunk costs and asymmetric information between the incumbent and 
new potential entrants) or the impact of external factor that could influence the 
award process (i.e. political pressure), competitive tendering alone could be 
ineffective. Perhaps combining competitive tendering with the use of an incentive 
regulatory mechanism (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), i.e. a cap on subsidies in order to 
harden the firm’s budget constraint (Boitani and Cambini, 2002b), could lead to a 
more efficient result. 
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